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17 To promote this idea, then Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, in conjunction with the United Nations Environment Programme and the World Meteorological Organization, convened a conference in Toronto, in June 1988, entitled "Our Changing Atmosphere: Implications for Global Security" (the Toronto Conference).
The Toronto Conference was one of the first high-level conferences on climate change and it revealed the importance of this emerging issue for the federal government. 18 The conference ended with the adoption of a statement calling for "immediate action" by governments, the UN, NGOs, industry and individuals to "counter the ongoing degradation of the atmosphere." 19 To that end, the statement listed a set of actions designed to "reverse the deterioration of the atmosphere," including the adoption by the governments and the industry of a CO2 emissions-reduction objective of approximately 20 percent below 1988 levels by the year 2005. The list also suggested that the UN develop a comprehensive framework convention on the protection of the atmosphere. 20 This conference represented a "breakthrough" that "put climate change on the political agenda of most governments in the industrialized world." 21 Even if a broader framework agreement for the protection of the atmosphere was not pursued by states, Canada continued to advocate during the years following the Toronto Conference for the elaboration of an international instrument on climate change.
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Thus, at the end of the 1980s, Canada was a strong supporter of the development of an international treaty in the field of climate change, with its prime minister reaffirming his determination to complete a framework convention on climate change. 23 However, even at that time, actions taken by the Canadian government raised questions of inconsistency with the position taken internationally. Indeed, as commentator Heather A. Smith explains, "Shortly after the Toronto Conference, the prime minister announced further subsidies to the Hibernia project [an offshore oil platform in Newfoundland and Labrador] -actions that seemed to contradict the concern expressed for climate change." 24 More specifically, these subsidies were not consistent with some of the actions listed in the Toronto Conference statement However, Canada's Green Plan primarily focused on improving energy efficiency, promoting public awareness on climate change and encouraging voluntary actions and clearly lacked substance or enforceability. As George Hoberg and Kathryn Harrison wrote, the plan contained "a paucity of measures to directly protect the environment," 29 like regulations or taxes, and "remarkably few commitments to address the pressing environmental problems." 30 The plan was insufficient to achieve the stabilization target and, in fact, it did not achieve the desired outcome, leading to inconsistency between the aims of the declaration and the domestic outcome. The divergence between Canada's position in climate talks and its domestic action became even more evident after the adoption of the UNFCCC. Canada strongly supported the negotiation of this treaty, 31 and was among the first developed countries to ratify it. 32 During the convention's negotiation (1991-1992), Canada co-chaired one of the two working groups in which the negotiations took place 33 and often acted as a facilitator and "worked to try to narrow the division between the United States and the European Community."
34 Beyond defining general guiding principles for cooperation and establishing an institutional framework, the UNFCCC provided a "loosely worded" mitigation target for developed countries. 35 Article 4(2)(a) referred to the need to "return by the end" of 2000 to earlier levels of anthropogenic GHGs in order to prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. In article 4(2)(b), developed countries committed themselves to the "aim of returning individually or jointly to their 1990 levels of these anthropogenic" GHG emissions. As Philippe Sands noted, "The most that can reasonably be said of these provisions is that they establish soft targets and timetables with a large number of loopholes."
36 Nevertheless, despite their ambiguity, these provisions and arguably this "soft" mitigation commitment legally bound Canada as a party to the UNFCCC.
However, after the entry into force of the UNFCCC in March 1994, the implementation of meaningful mitigation measures at the federal level proved to be difficult. In 1995, the federal-provincialterritorial National Action Program on Climate Change (NAPCC) was adopted. The goal of this initiative was to set "the strategic directions for pursuing the nation's objective of meeting its current commitment of stabilizing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions at 1990 levels by the year 2000." 37 While this approach was consistent with the mitigation During the federal government's consultations prior to preparing the NAPCC, environmentalists called for the use of coercive instruments, including economic instruments such as a carbon tax. 40 However, "[e] ven before the consultations were completed, the then Liberal Prime Minister Chrétien ruled out a carbon tax in order to reassure a nervous Alberta" and protect the associated interests of the province and the oil industry. 41 Thus, Canada's domestic action on climate change greatly contrasted with the strong support it had expressed at the international level for the elaboration of a climate treaty and more broadly for climate protection.
The Kyoto Years (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) In 1995, during the first Conference of the Parties (COP 1), the members of the UNFCCC agreed to launch the negotiation of a protocol or another instrument to strengthen the mitigation commitments of developed countries under the UNFCCC. 42 The negotiations ended in 1997 at COP 3, with the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC, which entered into force in 2005. Unlike the UNFCCC, this protocol established clear, individual, legally binding, quantified limitation or reduction targets for the GHG emissions of developed countries.
According to Ingrid Barnsley, during the Kyoto years, "Canada's attempts to respond to and to foster its international reputation as a supporter of environmental protection and multilateral cooperation were evident" at the international level. 43 During the negotiations of the protocol, the government played up its position "between the US and the EU and its desire to 'help find common ground in Kyoto,' reflecting an attempt to reinvigorate Canada's role as a facilitator of global agreement and compromise." 44 Moreover, in the final hours of the negotiations, Canada committed to a very ambitious reduction target (six percent below 1990 levels between 2008 and 2012). This target was far more stringent than the objective it had agreed with the provinces during federal-provincial consultation held in November 1997, which aimed at stabilizing GHG emissions at 1990 levels by 2010.
45 Some saw the decision of then Prime Minister Jean Chrétien to accept this ambitious target as motivated in large part by a desire to preserve Canada's international reputation on environmental issues and to go beyond its poor domestic performance on climate change. 46 At that time, Canada's emissions were continuing to rise -despite the adoption of the UNFCCC -and were 13.4 percent above 1990 levels. 47 Also, the fact that in 2002 Canada ratified the Kyoto Protocol, despite the US refusal to do so, was another element of its climate policy that reflected "the ideational importance of Canada's support for environmental protection and multilateral cooperation." 48 But some of the positions adopted by Canada in the climate talks during the Kyoto years on more technical issues also showed that Canada's support for multilateral action was not unconditional. For instance, Canada advocated strongly for forests to be accounted for as carbon sinks for the achievement of its reduction target and insisted on having flexibility in meeting its mitigation goal. 49 On these two issues, Canada's objectives, shared by some other developed countries, were achieved. The Kyoto Protocol allowed developed countries partially to fulfill their commitments by removing CO2 from the atmosphere through carbon sinks, 50 and provided three flexibility mechanisms ("joint implementation," the Clean 
.
50 Kyoto Protocol, arts 3.3, 3.4.
Development Mechanism and the emissions trading scheme) designed to "assist developed countries to reduce the costs of meeting their emissions reduction target by entering into joint projects with developing countries or purchasing reductions in other countries." 51 However, during the negotiation on the operating rules relating to carbon sinks and flexible mechanisms, the Canadian delegation adopted an inflexible attitude, and the "Canadian delegation was awarded the Fossil of the Day award more times than any other country" at COP 6.
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That said, on the whole, at the international level successive Canadian governments appeared, during the years of the elaboration of the Kyoto Protocol, to be rather "enthusiastic" about the protocol. 53 However, the support expressed internationally for this treaty was not reflected in federal domestic policy. It has been said that soon after the adoption of the protocol, Chrétien, in an attempt to appease the anger of some of the provinces, suggested that Canada would not ratify the protocol. 54 And in 2002, when Canada finally decided to ratify the protocol, some domestic political leaders implied that Canada had "no intention" of achieving its target. Canada's rejection of the Kyoto Protocol became even more manifest in 2011, when the federal government invoked its legal right to withdraw from the treaty, as provided for in article 27 of the protocol. To justify this decision, the Harper government underscored that staying inside Kyoto would hurt Canada's economy and that the strict differentiation between developed and developing countries upon which the protocol was based was not a good basis to address the climate crisis since it would allow countries like China and India to allow the growth of their GHG emissions without restriction. 70 Canada was certainly not the only developed country failing to meet its Kyoto commitment at that time. Countries such as Japan and New Zealand were also on track not to achieve their targets and therefore were not ardent supporters of the protocol. 71 Nevertheless, Canada remained the only Kyoto party to take the drastic step of withdrawing. The withdrawal met with strong international criticism as it was interpreted as an abdication of responsibility. Yet, since Canada was failing to achieve its commitment, one could argue that the withdrawal was a legitimate avenue to avoid a situation of being in breach of its international obligations. However, it must be noted that Canada could have chosen to stay inside Kyoto, to be in breach of its international obligations and to deal with the consequences of not achieving its targets. 72 Canada could then have chosen not to join the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. 73 Whatever the rationale for withdrawal, the decision to do so indicated that having a good international image for climate policy was definitely no longer a Canadian priority.
The move away from Kyoto was reflected in the position adopted domestically by the federal government on climate change. In October 2006, the government tabled Bill C-30, entitled Canada's Clean Air and Climate Change Act. 74 In its first-reading version, the bill contained no mention of the Kyoto Protocol, and the notice of intent indicated that "no firm limit would be set on greenhouse gas emissions until 2020 or 2025" and that "emissions regulations on large final emitters would not take effect until 2010." 75 Instead of killing the bill, the opposition parties in the House of Commons "rewrote the bill into forceful legislation that established targets consistent with Kyoto." 76 However, the government of the day did not hide its lack of enthusiasm for international mitigation commitments and, more broadly, for UN-style cooperation. 84 In the lead-up to COP 15, Harper "hewed to the view that most emissions targets would entail unacceptably adverse economic 84 Boardman, supra note 10.
and lifestyle changes," 85 and declared: "I think modest, achievable targets…will get the planet on the right track.…The key to all this is not the setting of targets. It is actually the development and implementation of the technology that over time will make significant targets possible." 86 Concurrently, Minister of Environment Jim Prentice stated, "There's always a lot of hype and drama that gets built into this sort of international event, much of it intended to force the hand of participants.…We aren't going to buy into that." 87 As a result, Canada was criticized in Copenhagen for being obstructionist and uncooperative. 88 During the Harper years, Canada received "a flood of criticisms from many delegates from developing and developed countries at the Conferences of the Parties" for not having more progressive environmental positions and for not being more supportive of the UN process. 89 Canada "won" many Fossil of the Day awards (including a "Lifetime Unachievement" Fossil award at COP 19, in Warsaw in 2013) 90 and increasingly it was portrayed as an international "laggard" 91 on the climate issue.
The lack of enthusiasm within the Harper government for meaningful action on climate change was also noticeable domestically. Following the adoption of the Copenhagen Accord, the federal government indicated that it would achieve its target through a "sector-by-sector regulatory approach" based on the implementation of various regulations under the Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999 (CEPA). 92 Accordingly, several sectoral regulations were implemented under the CEPA, mainly in the fields of transportation, coalfired electricity generation, and renewable fuel. 93 The glaring weakness of this sectoral and regulatory approach was that no regulations were implemented to address the emissions of the oil and gas industry, which was at that time the second-largest emitting sector in Canada. Consequently, in 2012, the commissioner of Environment and Sustainable Development indicated that "the forecast shows that in 2020, Canada's GHG emissions will be 7.4 percent above the 2005 instead of 17 percent below, which indicates that the 2020 target will not be met with existing measures."
94 Two years later, the commissioner noted that "the evidence is stronger that the growth in emissions will not be reversed in time and that the target will be missed." 95 Therefore, it can be said that Canada's positions at the international level and domestically were fairly aligned and symmetrical during the Harper years. The rhetoric rejecting the Kyoto Protocol and the unwillingness to be bound by international reduction targets at the international level were consistent with the choice of the federal government not to impose absolute quantified emission targets on the larger domestic emitters. This convergence between Canada's international and domestic voices on climate change policy did nothing to help Canada achieve international mitigation targets. However, it still represented a break from the divergence and contradiction that dominated Canada's foreign and domestic policy from 1988 to 2006. Justin Trudeau's Liberal government, elected in October 2015, had campaigned on a strong environmental platform that included addressing climate change. Notably, Trudeau vowed to put a price on carbon and to collaborate with the provinces and territories to establish national emissions-reduction targets. 96 After the election, he promised to restore Canada's international reputation and leadership in the fight against climate change, and to adopt a constructive attitude in climate talks. COP 21, in December 2015, provided a first opportunity to put this promise into practice.
The goal of COP 21 was to finalize the adoption of "a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the [UNFCCC] applicable to all Parties." 97 After two weeks of intense negotiations, the conference ended with the adoption of an international treaty, the Paris Agreement. 98 At the beginning of the conference, Trudeau declared that Canada would "take on a new leadership role internationally" and play a "constructive role at COP 21." 99 In fact, Canada was generally viewed as having a constructive attitude in the negotiations, as well as taking rather progressive environmental positions. 100 In particular, Minister of Environment Catherine McKenna supported a proposal from the island nations that aimed to limit the temperature increase below 1.5°C above preindustrial levels. She also strongly advocated for the recognition in the agreement of the importance of protecting human rights and rights of Indigenous peoples in the fight against climate change. 101 During the second week of the conference, Canada joined an informal alliance of developing and developed states, the so-called high ambition coalition, the members of which were committed to ensuring that the agreement would be ambitious. 102 On certain items of the negotiations, however, Canada had a more cautious attitude. For instance, Canada shared the view that the Paris Agreement should not serve as a legal basis to compensate developing countries for their loss and damage caused by climate change, and backed the United States in its opposition to legally binding mitigation pledges. 103 Also, along with the Umbrella Group (a negotiating group which included, inter alia, Canada, the United States, Australia, New Zealand, Japan and Russia), Canada earned a Fossil of the Day award for "standing in the way of increasing ambition before 2020." 104 However, Canada's change of tone in the climate talks was evident and viewed by many as a welcome change from the "Conservative government's antagonism to these international negotiations." 106 It should be noted that this target was first established by the Harper government in the run-up to COP 21 and then adopted by the Trudeau government, despite efforts by the environmental community to have the NDC increased and Trudeau's commitment that Canada would and could do more.
Nevertheless, since the 2015 change of government, Canada has continuously expressed its commitment to climate change and the federal government has striven to appear as an international leader on the issue. For instance, in June 2017, Canada along with the other members of the G7 pledged to phase out inefficient fossil fuel subsidies by 2025. 107 The pledge to phase out fossil fuel was mentioned in previous international declarations but never with a specific timetable. In September 2017, Canada, together with the European Union and China, hosted a meeting in Montreal to advance the implementation of the Paris Agreement. At COP 23, in November 2017, Canada partnered with the United Kingdom to launch the Powering Past Coal Alliance, an international initiative designed to advocate for the phase-out of traditional coal-fired power plants. 108 As this diplomatic activity demonstrates, Canada has spared no effort since October 2015 to restore its international reputation on climate change and to affirm its commitment to both climate action and multilateralism. One may well ask, however, whether the Trudeau government's international climate policy is consistent with or diverging from its domestic actions.
It must be noted that to a certain extent the rhetorical green internationalism of the Trudeau government has been followed by concrete actions at the domestic level. Convening a federalprovincial-territorial meeting in March 2016 in Vancouver was one of the federal government's first steps in the implementation of the Paris Agreement. During that meeting, the federal government and the provinces and territories adopted the Vancouver Declaration on Clean Growth and Climate Change.
Federal regulations on the phase-out of hydrofluorocarbons and methane are currently being prepared. 117 Other initiatives, such as reforms to the federal Environmental Impact Assessment process are also being developed and could affect the outcome of permitting processes for projects. In February 2018, the federal government tabled a bill in Parliament to enact a new Impact Assessment Act and repeal the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, 2012. The bill provides that the extent to which the effects of a project hinder or contribute to Canada's ability to meet its commitments in respect of climate change must be considered prior to approving new development projects 118 With all these legal initiatives under way, it appears that the federal government's climate policies internationally and domestically are consistent, or at least more so than between 1988 and 2005, a period during which very few normative developments occurred in relation to climate change at the federal level. However, it is too early to conclude that success in domestic implementation and consistency with international positions will be achieved.
Indeed, many of the legislative and regulatory reforms undertaken by the Trudeau government are not yet fully implemented. And if there is something to be learned from the history of Canadian climate policy, it is that the course of implementing comprehensive federal mitigation measures can be bumpy. The jury is still out on whether Canada, with its current federal climate policy, can meet its target under the Paris Agreement. Some sources anticipate that with the full implementation of the PCF, Canada could achieve its target, but others do not. 119 It is interesting to note that the outputbased pricing system of the federal backstop will only set emission-intensity standards for the major emitters, while achieving Canada's 2030 mitigation target requires absolute emission reductions. Also, with regard to the benchmark, some studies have shown that to achieve Canada's reduction target, "a price of $100 per tonne would need to be in place by 2020." 120 Finally, Canada's action on fossil fuel subsidies raises issues of consistency with Canada's commitment to climate protection. In 2017, an Auditor General report criticized the Department of Finance Canada for not having "an implementation plan with timelines" to phase out inefficient fossil fuel subsidies by 2025, and for having "refused to provide all the analyses" requested.
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This point leads to the uncomfortable question of whether continuing to develop the oil and gas industry is compatible with a meaningful climate policy. From a legal perspective, the Paris Agreement does not explicitly prescribe how state parties make their energy choices. The word "energy" is not even mentioned in the text of the agreement. According to article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, however, the Paris Agreement, being a "treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith."
122 This implies that Canada and the other states parties should refrain from acts that would defeat the object and purpose of the Paris Agreement. 123 Thus, one could ask whether the approval of new pipelines and the granting of subsidies to the oil and gas industry would be compatible with the purpose of the Paris Agreement. For the moment, the federal government seems to have taken the position that developing GHG-intensive energy projects is compatible with the fight against climate change. In March 2017, during a speech at an energy conference in Texas, Trudeau declared, "No country would find 173 billion barrels of oil in the ground and just leave them." thinking to assert that it is possible to develop a "climate plan" that would allow Canada to meet its commitments while at the same time substantially increasing oil and gas production." 125 In sum, the gap between Canada's international discourse and its domestic action on climate change is diminishing, but whether the two will fully align over the term of the Paris Agreement remains to be seen.
Conclusion
As this paper illustrates, Canada's foreign climate policy has greatly varied over time since its inception in the late 1980s. In some periods, Canada has been in "the rhetorical vanguard of greenhouse concern" 126 and has shown much enthusiasm for multilateral cooperation on climate change. At other times, Canada has not been inclined to adopt progressive climate positions or to strive to appear as a good international environmental citizen. In contrast, implementing meaningful climate measures at the federal level and achieving the internationally agreed mitigation targets has continuously proven to be a difficult task.
127 As a result, most of Canada's climate policy history has been dominated by a divergence between its positions in the climate talks -often enthusiastic and rather progressive -and its domestic actions.
Various reasons have been suggested to explain this divergence and Canada's inability to follow up on its international commitments. One explanation is economic. Canada's economy is "largely resources-driven" and "inextricably connected to the development of those resources," 128 and their development, especially oil and gas, comes with a high carbon footprint. Thus, it has been said that the "federal perception is that implementing Canada's short-term obligations is simply too costly." 129 Institutional reasons may also have played a role. For instance, some consider that Environment and Climate Change Canada, which was involved in the climate talks, was more committed to taking strong actions on climate change than other departments more involved in economic development and resource exploitation, such as Natural Resources Canada and Innovation, Science and Economic Development. 130 The fact that implementation of the Paris Agreement in Canada requires coordinated action by federal and provincial governments exercising their respective legislative authority also appears to be a relevant factor. As Douglas Macdonald and Heather Smith noted, "implementation strategies constitutionally required the involvement of the provinces because natural resources are under provincial jurisdiction."
131 According to these authors, "Jurisdictional interests, combined with powerful economic interests, made many provincial leaders wary of commitments to emissions reduction." 132 Regardless of the reasons, the divergence between Canada's foreign climate policy and its domestic action raises the more fundamental question of how Canada truly envisions international climate law. Generally speaking, one of the traditional functions of international law is to define legal rules to guide state behaviour. 133 But in the case of Canada -at least at the federal level -it appears that the necessity of acting in conformity with international climate law has not been fully "internalized" 134 by the legal system so that policy makers feel compelled 106:8 Yale LJ 2599 at 2602. In that sense, it could be argued that international climate law never fully penetrated Canada's legal system to become part, as Hongju Koh puts it, of the "nation's internal value set" (ibid at 2603).
to act in accordance with Canada's commitments. 135 In a famous article entitled "What is International Law for?," Martti Koskenniemi suggests that international law is just a tool available to states to achieve the goals they desire. 136 A similar question could be asked about Canada and international climate law: what exactly does Canada wish to achieve with international climate law?
Canada's foreign and domestic policy on climate change since the 1980s has been characterized by inconsistencies and difficulties in respect of domestic action. International climate law seems to have been envisioned as largely aspirational in nature. The time has come for Canada to rethink its approach to international climate law and use it as a means to shape and energize its domestic climate policy. CIGI Press books are distributed by McGill-Queen's University Press (mqup.ca) and can be found in better bookstores and through online book retailers.
